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Abstract
We argue in this paper that a more active market for corporate
control may weaken the takeover threat. We show that an increase
in the number of potential raiders tends to decrease the probability
of a takeover. This in turn weakens managerial incentives. The lower
managerial eﬀort level that results in equilibrium negatively aﬀects the
ex ante value of the ﬁrm.
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1 Introduction
Takeover threats can function as a corporate governance mechanism, in-
ducing managers to increase their eﬀorts (see e.g. Scharfstein, 1988; Hart,
1995). In this paper, we study the eﬀe c t so fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ro f
potential raiders on managerial eﬀort. The term potential raiders refers to
∗Department of Economics, University of Groningen, P.O.Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen,
The Netherlands. E-mail: L.A.Toolsema@eco.rug.nl. The author thanks Hans van Ees
and Marco Haan for useful discussion and comments.
1ﬁrms or persons who consider whether or not to actively monitor the ﬁrm
with the aim to take over if the ﬁrm is not managed well. We show that
an increase in the number of potential raiders may have adverse eﬀects and
reduce managerial eﬀort when monitoring is costly. This in turn lowers the
ex ante value of the ﬁrm.
In the corporate governance literature, it is often stated that an ‘active
market for corporate control’ is required for takeover threats to discipline
management. In most cases, it is not explained in detail what this means.
It usually refers to a somewhat vague assumption that a ﬁrm’s shares can
be freely traded, and raiders are able to quickly obtain large amounts of
resources and gain control over the ﬁr m( e . g .A l l e na n dG a l e ,2 0 0 0 ,p .9 7 ;
see also Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 756). In this paper we consider the
eﬀects of a ‘more active’ or larger market for corporate control, in the sense
of the number of actors on that market. We show that having more potential
raiders may attenuate managerial incentives. Note that in some situations
the takeover threat itself may decrease managerial eﬀort as compared to the
situation without a takeover threat. For example, since a takeover implies
that the current manager will be overruled, the takeover threat may reduce
the manager’s incentives to exert eﬀort in the ﬁrst place (Haan and Riyanto,
2002). Also, a takeover may break the implicit contract between workers
and managers, inducing workers to invest less in relationship-speciﬁch u m a n
capital (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). Even so, we focus on the standard
case where a takeover threat disciplines management relative to the case
without the threat (i.e. with zero potential raiders).
We focus on outside raiders and do not consider the possibility that a large
shareholder takes over the ﬁrm. The reason is that we require dispersed own-
ership (see section 2). Whenever an outside (inside) party takes over and
there is a (another) large shareholder, this assumption is violated. Further-
more, a large shareholder may have an incentive not to tender but retain his
2shares in case of a takeover, in order to obtain his share of the capital gain
involved (see also section 2) Therefore, we focus on governance structures
characterized by dispersed ownership and our model applies in particular to
takeovers in Anglo-Saxon countries (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Even if a ﬁrms’ shares are freely traded, the number of potential raiders
is likely to be limited. Despite the proﬁto p p o r t u n i t y ,n o te v e r y b o d yi s
willing and able to take over a badly managed ﬁrm and run it himself. A
successful takeover requires more than acquiring suﬃcient funds and buying
the shares. In order to be proﬁtable, the ﬁrm needs to be run properly after
the takeover. For this reason, a takeover may well require some knowledge of
the industry or technology. Empirical evidence shows that acquisitions often
concern related ﬁrms, e.g. ﬁrms in the same line of business (see Bolton and
Scharfstein, 1998, pp. 109-110, and the references therein). So, the number
of potential raiders might be related to, say, the number of competitors
a ﬁrm has. Only these competitors may be capable to run the ﬁrm after
takeover.
Intuitively, a higher number of potential raiders suggests a ‘more active’
market for corporate control. Thus, with more potential raiders one would
expect the takeover threat to become stronger, and the manager to exert
more eﬀort. However, we show that this is not necessarily true. If two or
more raiders are trying to take over the same ﬁrm, they engage in a bidding
war. They bid up until the highest bid equals the value of the ﬁrm after
takeover, and the winner earns zero proﬁts (this is sometimes referred to
as the winner’s curse). So, the return from trying to take over the ﬁrm
depends on how many other raiders are trying to do the same thing. We
refer to raiders actually monitoring the ﬁrm - with the aim to take over if
the ﬁrm is not managed well - as active raiders.1 If there is only one active
1In general, a raider who has monitored the ﬁrm does not necessarily want to take over
whenever the manager performs badly. For example, in reality monitoring may not yield
3raider, this raider can earn a proﬁtf r o mt a k i n go v e rt h eﬁrm if it is badly
managed. However, if the number of active raiders exceeds one, they all
have zero net return. Now suppose there is a ﬁxed cost for a raider to step
in, i.e. to actively monitor the ﬁrm and acquire private information. Then
an increase in the number of potential raiders implies that each individual
raider expects to face increased competition when he becomes active, and
expects to earn a negative return with an increased probability. This reduces
his incentives to step in. Indeed, we show that the probability of zero active
raiders increases with the number of potential raiders. This reduces the
takeover threat that the manager is facing. As a result, in equilibrium, the
manager chooses to exert less eﬀort, which decreases the ex ante value of
the ﬁrm.
The problem that a raider may face competition from other bidders, and a
bidding war may result, is well known in the literature (see e.g. Scharfstein,
1988, p. 196; Hart, 1995, pp. 684-685; Allen and Gale, 2000, p. 99). In
this paper, we provide a formal analysis of the problem and discuss the
eﬀects of the possibility of a bidding war on monitoring by potential raiders,
and thereby on managerial eﬀort and the ex ante value of the ﬁrm. In the
literature, additional raiders are often assumed to be attracted by the initial
raider’s bid, which indicates to them that the ﬁrm is undervalued (Hart,
1995, pp. 684-685). This causes the bidding war. Instead, we assume that
each raider must monitor the ﬁrm himself in order to obtain the relevant
information privately. That is, even if an uninformed raider observes the
initial raider’s bid and concludes that the ﬁrm must be undervalued, there
is no use in making a bid himself. If the uninformed raider were to take over
the ﬁrm, he has no idea how to make it more proﬁtable. See also Grossman
and Hart (1980, p. 58), who argue that ex ante costs of monitoring tend to
the required information with probability one. In our setup, we assume that it does, and
we refer to an active raider as a raider who monitors the ﬁrm and makes a takeover bid
whenever the manager shirks.
4limit ex post competition between raiders since uninformed raiders cannot
eﬀectively compete with the initial raider.
The decision of potential raiders to become active is closely related to the
entry decision in a Bertrand market, described by Elberfeld and Wolfstet-
ter (1999). In a Bertrand market, proﬁts drop to zero as soon as two or
more entrants enter. Elberfeld and Wolfstetter show how an increase in the
number of potential entrants increases the probability of a market break-
down. The coordination game described by Anderson and Engers (2002)
is also related. They describe the game presented in the ﬁlm ‘A beautiful
mind’, where John Nash points out how he and his friends should direct
attention to a number of women in a bar. One of the women is a partic-
ularly beautiful blonde. Whenever more than one of the friends go for the
blonde, none of them will get her, nor will they get any of the other women
since they do not like to be second choice. Note that both of these games,
as well as the game described in this paper, resemble an all-pay auction:
each (active) participant incurs a cost, but only one of them may win the
prize. Several other studies use a related framework to describe free riding
in the provision of a public good. Mukhopadhaya (2003) uses such a frame-
work to illustrate why larger juries may make poorer decisions. Haan and
Kooreman (2003) argue that majorities may lose elections in the presence
of voting costs. Johnson (2002) describes open source software development
as the provision of a public good and shows that an increase in the number
of developers may lead to a smaller probability of development. Finally,
Harrington (2001) explains why people are more reluctant to help a person
in need when there are more people who can help.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
present the basic setup of the model. In section 3, we discuss as a benchmark
the model without raiders who may monitor the manager. Section 4 turns
to the case with a single raider, and section 5 describes the general model
5with n ≥ 1 potential raiders. In section 6 we study the eﬀects of a change
in the number of potential raiders on the takeover threat and thereby on
managerial eﬀort. We also examine the consequences for the value of the
ﬁrm and the value of the shares. Section 7 concludes.
2 Setup of the model
Consider a ﬁrm that is run by a single manager and owned by shareholders.
The manager must implement one of m + 1 projects, m ≥ 2. Project i
yields a return θi, i =0 ,...,m, to the shareholders. The manager receives
af r a c t i o n0< α < 1o ft h er e t u r nθi.2 This assumption implies that the
preferences of the manager and the shareholders over diﬀerent projects are
aligned. Returns are such that if a project i  = 0 is implemented at random,
the expected return is strictly smaller than the a priori known return of
project 0, θ0 > 0. Thus, if no information is available, project i =0i s
preferred. If the manager exerts eﬀort, he (privately) learns all information,
i.e. learns all θi, i =0 ,...,m. This allows him to implement the project that
yields the highest return, ¯ θ ≡ maxi θi.T h ev a l u e¯ θ is common knowledge;
however, the project i for which it obtains can only be learned by exerting
eﬀort. This project is optimal both for the shareholders and for the manager.
Exerting eﬀort comes with a cost c>0 for the manager, though.
We assume that ownership is dispersed. This implies a free-riding problem
for the shareholders. They do not have suﬃcient incentives to monitor the
manager. In the general model, we assume that there are n ≥ 1p o t e n t i a l
raiders who may monitor the ﬁrm. The timing is as follows. At t =1 ,
the manager observes n, the number of potential raiders. At t =2 ,e a c h
potential raider decides whether or not to pay a ﬁxed cost I.B y d o i n g
2Note that the total return of project i is given by (1 + α)θi;a na m o u n tθi ﬂows to
the shareholders and an amount αθi to the manager in charge.
















Figure 1: Timing of the model.
so, the raider becomes active and privately learns all the information about
the projects. Simultaneously, the manager decides whether or not to exert
eﬀort. At t = 3, the manager announces the project i he will implement. At
t = 4, an active raider can take over the ﬁrm and ﬁre the manager. If there
is only one active raider, he pays a premium ρ > 0o v e rt h ev a l u eo ft h e
shares without a takeover. (This premium will be discussed below.) If there
is more than one active raider, there is a bidding war and the winner pays
exactly the value of the ﬁrm after takeover, i.e. ¯ θ,t ot h es h a r e h o l d e r s . I n
both cases, the ﬁred manager has utility UF.A tt = 5, the preferred project
(of the manager if there was no takeover; of the winning raider if there was
a takeover) is implemented, and payoﬀs are realized. Figure 1 summarizes
the timing.
Note that in case of a takeover, again, there may be a free-riding problem.
Small shareholders - that is, all shareholders in our setup - have an incentive
not to tender, but keep their shares instead. By doing so, the individual
shareholder could obtain his share of the capital gain from the takeover.
Thus, in this setup, the only successful bid would equal the value of the ﬁrm
after takeover (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Hart, 1995). In order to avoid this
problem, we simply assume that each shareholder believes that if he does
not trade, the takeover will not take place (Huddart, 1993). An alternative
solution could be that takeover law allows some expropriation of minority
7shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980).
The premium ρ does not refer to the takeover premium that is commonly
used in the empirical literature. There, the takeover premium is the dif-
ference between the price paid by the raider, and the value of the shares
before the announcement of the takeover. Here, instead, the premium ρ
refers to the diﬀerence between the price paid by the raider, and the value
of the shares when there is no takeover (as is the case in Haan and Riyanto,
2002). Clearly, the price paid by the raider in this setup depends on the
eﬀort exerted by the manager. Alternatively, we could assume that in case
of a takeover a ﬁxed price P is paid, independent of the manager’s actions.
This would not qualitatively change the results, as we will discuss in section
6.
In the next section, we discuss the benchmark model without a takeover
threat (n = 0). We present two conditions on the parameters that ensure
monitoring to increase eﬀort. That is, under these conditions the manager
does not exert eﬀort if there is no monitoring, whereas with monitoring (say,
if there is only one shareholder) he does exert eﬀort. After deriving these
conditions, we turn to the discussion of takeover threats and consider the
case n ≥ 1.
3 Benchmark model: No takeover threat
First consider the model with n = 0 as a benchmark. That is, there are no
potential raiders - there is no takeover threat. Denote the manager’s eﬀort
by eM. This variable takes the value one if the manager exerts eﬀort, incurs
cost c, and learns all information. Otherwise, it equals zero. The manager’s
8utility UM c a nt h e nb ew r i t t e na s 3
UM =
+
α¯ θ − c
αθ0
if eM =1 ,
if eM =0 .
At t = 2, the manager maximizes UM and will choose not to exert eﬀort
whenever α¯ θ − c<αθ0.
Assumption 1 We have α¯ θ − c<αθ0.
That is, we assume that the manager’s utility of exerting eﬀort falls below
his utility of not exerting eﬀort. Under this condition, without monitoring
(either by shareholders or by raiders), the manager will choose eM =0a n d
implement project i = 0. So, without monitoring the manager will not exert
any eﬀort. The value of the ﬁrm, vF,i st h e ng i v e nb y
vF = θ0
and equals the value of the shares, denoted by vS.4
For comparison, consider the case with a single, large shareholder who is
able to monitor the ﬁrm. If this shareholder monitors for sure, the manager




α¯ θ − c
UF
if eM =1 ,
if eM =0 .
The manager now prefers to exert eﬀort whenever α¯ θ − c>U F.
3Note that we could alternatively focus on pM, the probability with which the manager
exerts eﬀort, and write UM = pM

α¯ θ − c

+( 1− pM)αθ0. This would yield the same
condition for the manager not to exert eﬀort (with probability one).
4We distinguish between the ex ante value of the ﬁrm and the expected value of the
shares, because they may not be the same in our model in the presence of a takeover
threat. The value of the shares is aﬀected by the price paid by the raider in case of a
takeover, whereas the value of the ﬁrm is only determined by the return of the project to
be implemented.
5Again, we could alternatively focus on pM,a n dw r i t eUM = pM

α¯ θ − c

+
(1 − pM)UF. This would yield the same condition for the manager to exert eﬀort (with
probability one).
9Assumption 2 We have α¯ θ − c>U F.
We assume that the manager’s utility of exerting eﬀort exceeds his utility of
being ﬁr e d( w h i c ho c c u r sw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yo n ei fh ed o e sn o te x e r te ﬀort).
Thus, under these assumptions, the manager prefers to exert eﬀort (eM =1 )
and announce the project yielding ¯ θ, and monitoring clearly increases eﬀort
by the manager. Note that in this situation, vF = vS = ¯ θ.
We assume Assumptions 1 and 2 to be satisﬁed throughout the remainder
of this paper. They are required for a takeover threat to possibly work as a
governance mechanism: if Assumption 1 is violated, the manager will exert
eﬀort anyway; and if Assumption 2 is violated, even complete monitoring
will not induce the manager to exert eﬀort.
4 Takeover threat: Single raider
In this section we return to the case with dispersed ownership, in which there
is no monitoring by shareholders. Now suppose that n =1 ,t h a ti s ,t h e r ei s
a single potential raider. At t = 2, the potential raider can either become
active or not, and the manager can exert eﬀort or not. Together, this yields
four possible cases: (i) the raider is not active and the manager does not
exert eﬀort; (ii) the raider is not active but the manager does exert eﬀort;
(iii) the raider is active and the manager does not exert eﬀort, so a takeover
will occur and the manager will be ﬁred; and (iv) the raider is active and
the manager exerts eﬀort and implements the preferred project, so their is
no scope for a takeover. The payoﬀs of the manager and the raider in each
of the four cases are presented in Table 1. In each cell, the ﬁrst term gives
the utility of the manager, UM, and the second term represents the payoﬀ










α¯ θ − c
0
α¯ θ − c
−I
Table 1: Payoﬀs to manager and raider in the model with a single raider.
when the the manager did not exert eﬀort. We assume that
Π ≡ ¯ θ − (1 + ρ)vS,NT,
where vS,NT denotes the value of the shares without a takeover. That is,
we assume that when a takeover occurs, the raider buys the ﬁrms’ shares at
ap r e m i u mρ over vS,NT (for a discussion of ρ, see section 2). We assume
Π >I>0 to rule out the trivial case where a takeover never occurs and
there is no takeover threat. This implies an assumption on parameter values
that will be derived in detail below.
From Table 1, using Assumptions 1 and 2, it can be seen that no Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies exists. Therefore, consider a mixed strategy
equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, the manager exerts eﬀort with probabil-
ity 0 <p M < 1 and the raider becomes active with probability 0 <p R < 1.
With this notation,
vS,NT = pM¯ θ +( 1− pM)θ0,
since with probability pM the manager exerts eﬀort and the shareholders get
¯ θ, whereas with probability 1−pM he does not exert eﬀort and shareholders
only get θ0. In equilibrium the manager must be indiﬀerent between exerting
11eﬀo r ta n dn o te x e r t i n ge ﬀort, that is
α¯ θ − c = pRUF +( 1− pR)αθ0,










We have 0 <p ∗
R < 1 by Assumptions 1 and 2. Further, the raider must be
indiﬀerent between entering and not entering:
(1 − pM)Π − I =0 ,
that is,
(1 − pM)
¯ θ − (1 + ρ)

pM¯ θ +( 1− pM)θ0

− I =0 .





2 +4I (1 + ρ)
¯ θ − θ0

2(1+ρ)
¯ θ − θ0
 ,







2 +4I (1 + ρ)
¯ θ − θ0

2(1+ρ)
¯ θ − θ0
 . (2)
Equations (1) and (2) determine the equilibrium strategies of the potential
raider and the manager in the model with n =1 .
A necessary condition for a takeover threat is that Π >Iin equilibrium,
that is
¯ θ − (1 + ρ)

p∗




This can be rewritten to give
ρ <
¯ θ − θ0 − I
θ0
.
12This condition is necessary for the takeover to be proﬁtable. It states that
ρ, the premium paid over the value of the shares without a takeover, should
not be too high. Note that if we would set θ0 = 0, the condition would
be satisﬁed for all values of ρ, since the right hand side of this inequality
approaches inﬁnity as θ0 approaches 0. The critical value for ρ is increasing
in ¯ θ: the higher the ﬁr m ’ sv a l u ea f t e rt h et a k e o v e r ,t h em o r et h er a i d e ri s
willing to pay. It is decreasing in θ0 as well as in I: the higher the value
of the shares without a takeover, vS,NT, (which is increasing in θ0)a n dt h e
higher the costs of monitoring the ﬁrm, the lower the premium over vS,NT the
raider is willing to pay. Finally, note that the right hand side of this equality
may become negative for speciﬁcv a l u e so f¯ θ, θ0,a n dI. In that case, there
would be no ρ which ensures that the takeover is proﬁtable. Evidently, we
assume that this is not the case; instead we assume this necessary condition
for a takeover to be satisﬁed.
The expected value of the ﬁrm with a single potential raider is given by
vF = pM¯ θ +( 1− pM)

pR¯ θ +( 1− pR)θ0

,
and the ex ante value of the shares is
vS = pM¯ θ +( 1− pM)

pR (1 + ρ)






where (1) and (2) should be used to substitute for pR = p∗
R and pM = p∗
M
to obtain the equilibrium values.
5 Takeover threat: Multiple raiders
Now we turn to the general model with n ≥ 1 potential raiders. It is easy
to see that there are n asymmetric equilibria in which precisely one raider
becomes active, and all others stay out. We focus on the unique symmetric
equilibrium in which all raiders become active with the same probability pR.
13Before deriving the equilibrium mixed strategies of the potential raiders and
the manager, we ﬁrst introduce some deﬁnitions (following closely Elberfeld
and Wolfstetter, 1999).
Let p0 denote the probability of no takeover. This refers to the probability
that none of the raiders become active. This probability is given by
p0 =( 1− pR)
n. (3)
Let p1 denote the probability of a single active raider;
p1 = npR(1 − pR)
n−1. (4)
Finally, p2+ refers to the probability that multiple (at least two) raiders
become active and is given by
p2+ =1 − p0 − p1
=1 − (1 − pR)
n − npR(1 − pR)
n−1.
The condition for the manager to be indiﬀerent between exerting eﬀort and
not exerting eﬀort can now be written as
α¯ θ − c =( 1− p0)UF + p0αθ0. (5)
A potential raider is indiﬀerent between being active and not being active if
(1 − pR)
n−1(1 − pM)
¯ θ − (1 + ρ)vS,NT

− I =0 . (6)
If the raider becomes active, he incurs a cost I for sure. If he is the only
active raider, which happens with probability (1 − pR)
n−1,h ee a r n sag r o s s
return ¯ θ − (1 + ρ)vS,NT if and only if the manager does not exert eﬀort,
which happens with probability 1−pM. Otherwise, his gross return is zero.
This yields the left hand side of condition (6). The right hand side is the
net return of not becoming active, which is simply zero.



















n (1 + ρ)
¯ θ − θ0

2(1+ρ)
¯ θ − θ0
 . (8)
Equations (7) and (8) describe the equilibrium mixed strategies of the man-
ager and the potential raiders. Clearly, both p∗
M and p∗
R depend on n.
Again, a necessary condition for a takeover threat is that Π >Iin equi-
librium, that is a single active raider should be able to make a proﬁtw h e n
taking over. This condition can be written as
¯ θ − (1 + ρ)

p∗




Rewriting as a condition on ρ,t h i si s
ρ <















This condition is necessary for the takeover to be proﬁtable. It states that
ρ, the premium paid over the value of the shares without a takeover, should
not be too high. Note that the right hand side of this equality may become
negative for speciﬁc parameter values, so there may be no ρ which ensures
that the takeover is proﬁtable. Evidently, we assume that this is not the case;
instead we assume this necessary condition for a takeover to be satisﬁed.
Finally, we have
vF = pM¯ θ +( 1− pM)

p0θ0 +( 1− p0)¯ θ

(10)
vS = pM¯ θ +( 1− pM)[p0θ0
+p1(1 + ρ)






15where (7) and (8) should be used to substitute for pR = p∗
R and pM = p∗
M
to obtain the equilibrium values.
6E ﬀects of a change in the number of potential
raiders
We now turn to a discussion of the comparative static eﬀects of a change
in the number of potential raiders, n. As we argued in the introduction, in
general a ‘more active market for corporate control’ is thought to increase the
takeover threat, which in turn increases managerial eﬀort. In this section we
explore the eﬀects of a ‘more active market’ in the sense of more potential
raiders on the takeover threat (represented by pR or p0) and managerial
eﬀort (pM) in our model. We also consider the eﬀects of a change in n on
the expected value of the ﬁrm and the ex ante value of the shares.
Lemma 1 In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the probability of zero active
raiders, p∗




Proof. In equilibrium, condition (5) must hold for the manager to be indif-
ferent between exerting eﬀort and not exerting eﬀort. From this condition,
p∗
0 c a nb es o l v e dt og i v e
p∗
0 =







Note that from (12) and Assumptions 1 and 2, we have 0 <p ∗
0 < 1i n
equilibrium. Now consider the eﬀects of a change in n on the potential
raiders’ equilibrium strategy.
Result 1 In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the probability that a potential
raider is active, p∗




16Proof. We have p∗
0 =( 1− p∗
R)
n,s op∗
R =1− n s
p∗













which is negative since 0 <p ∗
0 < 1.
Intuitively, for a given potential raider, an increase in the number of potential
raiders implies increased competition. This decreases a potential raider’s ex
ante probability of winning, and therefore reduces the incentive to become
active. That is, it reduces pR. Clearly, this aﬀects p0, the probability that
no raider is active. The direct eﬀect of n is to decrease p0; however, the
associated decrease in pR tends to increase p0. Additionally, there will be




Result 2 In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the probability for the manager
to exert eﬀort, p∗











¯ θ − θ0

4I (1 + ρ)















n (1 + ρ)


















n (1 + ρ)
¯ θ − θ0

,
which is negative from Assumptions 1 and 2.









¯ θ − (1 + ρ)

pM¯ θ +( 1− pM)θ0
,




a n da ni n c r e a s ei nn increases p0:
dp0
dn








As we argued above, the direct eﬀect of an increase in n is to decrease p0,
but because of increased competition the potential raiders become active
with a smaller probability, which increases p0.I tt u r n so u tt h a tt h el a t t e r
eﬀect dominates (see also Elberfeld and Wolfstetter, 1999, who have a similar
result for the probability of a market breakdown with Bertrand competition).
Thus, an increase in n decreases the takeover threat that the manager is
facing. This induces him to exert less eﬀort, i.e. exert eﬀort with a smaller
probability pM. In fact, the manager lowers pM precisely to the level for
which the takeover threat (indicated by p0)i sj u s ta ss t r o n ga si tw a sb e f o r e
t h ei n c r e a s ei nn (see Lemma 1).6
In equilibrium, the probability that a single raider becomes active (p1)a s
well as the probability that at least two raiders become active (p2+)a l s o
depend on n.
Lemma 2 In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the probability that exactly one
raider becomes active, p∗




























6Note that the increase in n also aﬀects the condition for a takeover to be proﬁtable,
(9). The critical value for ρ may either increase or decrease, depending on the values of
the parameters. In the latter case, the increase in n may cause the takeover threat to
disappear completely, if (9) is violated for the new value of n.
18with p∗
0 given by (12). Using Lemma 1,
dp∗
1


















For n =1 ,
dp∗
1
dn < 0. (This inequality follows from the property of the




































dn < 0f o ra l l( ﬁnite) values of n.
Lemma 3 In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the probability that two or
more raiders become active, p∗














dn . The lemma now follows using Lemma 2.
Finally, consider the eﬀects of a change in n on the expected value of the
ﬁrm (vF)a n dt h ee xa n t ev a l u eo ft h es h a r e s( vS).
Result 3 The equilibrium expected value of the ﬁrm, v∗

























which is negative from Result 2.
This result is intuitive: an increase in n weakens the takeover threat and
therefore decreases managerial eﬀo r t ,w h i c hi nt u r nn e g a t i v e l ya ﬀects ﬁrm
value. A similar result holds for the value of the shares.
19Result 4 The equilibrium ex ante value of the shares, v∗
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In this expression, the ﬁrst term must be negative since ¯ θ > [·]. Since by
assumption Π∗ = ¯ θ − (1 + ρ)

p∗
M¯ θ +( 1− p∗
M)θ0

> 0, using Lemma 2 the
second term is positive.
After some tedious calculations, the derivative
dv∗
S





























Y ≡ ρ2¯ θ
2 +4 I (p∗
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−n−1
n (1 + ρ)
¯ θ − θ0

.
We must have 1 − 1
n
¯ θ−θ0 √














































For n = 1, (13) equals
1 − p∗
0 +( l np∗
0)p∗
0 > 0
(the inequality can be veriﬁed by noting that the derivative with respect to
p∗
0 of this expression is given by lnp∗
0 < 0, and the limit for p∗
0 → 1o ft h e

























Thus, the expression in (13) is strictly positive for any ﬁnite n. This implies
dv∗
S
dn < 0( f o ra n yﬁnite n).
This result illustrates that the negative eﬀects of an increase in n (decreasing
managerial eﬀort, and decreasing the price paid for the shares in the presence
of a single active raider) dominate the positive eﬀects (making the presence
of a single active raider less likely but that of more than one active raiders -
in which case the winner pays a higher price for the shares - more likely). To
see this, observe that the term between square brackets in (11) represents
the expected value of the shares if the manager does not exert eﬀort, and is
strictly smaller than ¯ θ, the expected value if the manager does exert eﬀort.
An increase in n decreases managerial eﬀort p∗
M,w h i c hp u t sm o r ew e i g h t
on the former, smaller term. This decreases v∗
S. Also, the price paid for the
shares in case of a takeover with only one active raider falls, since v∗
S,NT
falls. This also decreases v∗
S. However, there are additional eﬀects running
via p∗
1 and p∗
2+.A ni n c r e a s ei nn will make a single active raider (who pays
(1 + ρ)v∗
S,NT to the shareholders in case of a takeover) less likely, and two
21or more active raiders (who engage in a bidding war in case of a takeover,
which yields ¯ θ > (1 + ρ)v∗
S,NT to the shareholders) more likely. Combined
with the result that p∗
0 is independent of n,t h i si n c r e a s e sv∗
S. It turns out
that the sum of all these eﬀects is negative; that is, the positive eﬀects via
p∗
1 and p∗
2+ a r ed o m i n a t e db yt h en e g a t i v ee ﬀects running via p∗
M.
For completeness, we discuss here some asymptotic results. We consider
what happens if the population of potential raiders grows large. Recall that
p∗
0 does not depend on n. It can easily be veriﬁed that both the potential
raiders and the manager have little incentive to exert eﬀort in the limit:
both p∗
R and p∗
M converge to zero as n →∞ . Note that these probabilities
are never equal to zero though, since that cannot be a Nash equilibrium. A
similar result holds for p∗
1, and thus p∗
2+ has the limiting value 1 − p∗
0.I n
the limit, the probability that there is exactly one active raider disappears.
This implies that v∗
F and v∗
S have the same limiting value, which is equal to
p∗
0θ0 +( 1− p∗
0)¯ θ.
Finally, suppose that a ﬁxed price P were paid in case of a takeover, instead
of the amount (1 + ρ)vS,NT. As we mentioned in section 2, this would not
qualitatively change the results. This can be seen as follows. An increase in
the number of potential raiders, n, decreases the probability of a takeover,
1−p0. This in turn implies a decrease in pM, which in turn decreases vS,NT.
So in our model, if n increases, the takeover becomes cheaper. If it does not
become cheaper, as is the case with a ﬁxed takeover price P, a takeover will
be even less likely. Thus, our results with respect to pM, pR,a n dvF will
continue to hold.
7 Concluding remarks
We have shown that when monitoring is costly an increase in the number
of potential raiders may decrease managerial eﬀort. For a given managerial
22eﬀort level, a higher number of potential raiders implies that each individ-
ual raider faces increased competition, and therefore has less incentive to
become active. It turns out that this decreases the takeover threat. This
induces the manager to exert less eﬀort. In turn, this tends to reduce the ex-
pected value of the ﬁrm as well as the ex ante value of the shares. Thus, one
should be careful when asserting that an ‘active market for corporate con-
trol’ is required for takeover threats to function as a corporate governance
mechanism. In our setup, a larger market in the sense of more potential
raiders tends to reduce the eﬀectiveness of this governance mechanism.
In our model, there is some probability that no raider becomes active, and a
takeover will not occur. In equilibrium, this probability depends on exoge-
nous parameters of the model only, and it is independent of the number of
potential raiders. In the model, assuming that a takeover can be proﬁtable,
it is always strictly greater than zero. This may provide an explanation for
‘[t]he fact that companies can persist for long periods, operating publicly
at proﬁt levels substantially below maximum proﬁt’ (Grossman and Hart,
1980, p. 58). Even if there is only one potential raider, this raider may follow
a mixed strategy (as in the equilibrium of our model), which implies that
he does not necessarily invest in monitoring the ﬁrm. Thus, if the manager
shirks and implements the ‘wrong’ project, a takeover will not necessarily
follow. If the values of the parameters are such that the probability of hav-
ing no active raiders is close to zero, in a repeated version of the model the
manager may shirk for quite some time without the ﬁrm being subject to a
takeover.
In some situations takeover threats may decrease managerial eﬀort. For
example, the possibility of getting ﬁred lowers the incentive of a manager
to invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital (Kahn and Huberman, 1988). Also,
takeovers break the implicit contracts between managers and workers, and a
takeover threat thus reduces worker’s incentives to engage in such contracts
23(Shleifer and Summers, 1988). Finally, takeover threats may decrease man-
agerial eﬀort if the manager derives private beneﬁts and his preferences are
not perfectly aligned with those of shareholders (Haan and Riyanto, 2002).
Clearly, our results suggest that in these cases an increase in the number of
potential raiders will increase eﬀort by the manager.
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